Illiberal democracy
Elections are real and are won, but courts, press and civil society are brought under control between them — majority rule without the constraints liberalism attaches to it.
What does this mean?
Illiberal democracy accepts elections and rejects liberalism. Its argument is that the two are separable: that liberal constraints — independent courts, an autonomous press, protected minorities, supranational law — are not part of democracy but limits on it, imposed by unelected bodies against the expressed will of the majority. Removing them is presented not as an attack on democracy but as its completion.
In practice this produces a recognisable sequence. A government wins power legitimately, then rewrites the constitution or packs the constitutional court; changes the electoral system in its own favour; brings public broadcasters under party control and pressures private media through advertising and ownership; restricts foreign-funded civil society; and continues holding elections that it wins with a shrinking but sufficient margin. Opposition parties compete but do not compete on equal terms.
The term is contested. Its practitioners have used it approvingly — Viktor Orbán’s 2014 speech announcing the building of an "illiberal state" is the clearest statement anyone has made of it. Its critics argue the label concedes too much, and that once the referee has been captured the elections are no longer meaningfully democratic.
Where did it come from?
The term was coined by Fareed Zakaria in 1997 to describe elected governments that ignored constitutional limits. It was adopted approvingly by Viktor Orbán in 2014 and has since been applied to Hungary, Poland under Law and Justice, Türkiye after 2017, and elements of politics in India, Israel and the United States.
Major thinkers
- Fareed Zakaria
- Steven Levitsky
- Daniel Ziblatt
- Carl Schmitt
Historical figures
- Viktor Orbán
- Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
What it looks like today
- Hungary under Fidesz since 2010, including the 2011 constitution and media authority
- Poland under Law and Justice, 2015–2023, and its restructuring of the courts
- Türkiye following the 2017 constitutional referendum
Where it sits on each dimension
Wealth and inequality
Varies widely. Its practitioners have run interventionist and market-oriented economies alike, so this axis carries little diagnostic weight.
The state in the economy
Personal liberty
Press and civil society are subordinated to the elected government on the argument that they are unaccountable.
Tradition and change
Nation and the world
Sovereignty against supranational bodies is central — EU institutions, international courts and foreign-funded organisations are treated as illegitimate constraints.
Religion and the state
Power and its limits
Elections are retained; the checks that would allow a government to lose one are not. This is the axis the whole tradition turns on.
Environment and growth
Crime and punishment
Its strongest arguments
- It states a real problem: unelected courts and supranational bodies do overrule elected majorities, and that requires justification rather than assumption.
- Its practitioners have won repeated elections with substantial margins, which is not what a purely imposed system looks like.
- It has held up against the assumption that liberalism and democracy necessarily arrive together.
Its strongest criticisms
- Removing the referee is not a neutral act: it makes losing an election structurally unlikely, which is the point of the exercise.
- The protections dismantled are precisely those that protect people who cannot assemble a majority.
- Every mechanism used to entrench one government is available to its successors, which is why the practice tends to escalate.
Common misconceptions
- That it means rigged elections. Votes are often counted accurately; the manipulation is in the conditions under which the campaign happens.
- That it is a stable end state. Comparative research finds it usually either consolidates into competitive authoritarianism or is reversed at a subsequent election.
- That it is only a right-wing phenomenon. Venezuela under Chávez followed a similar sequence from the left.
A caveat
A high score here reflects views about executive power and national sovereignty. It is not a claim about anyone’s intentions, and this entry is not offered as a headline result.
Sources
- Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy · Foreign Affairs · 1997
- Viktor Orbán, Speech at Băile Tuşnad · 2014
- Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die · 2018